We are concerned with the problem of uncertain decision making. The paradigm of decision making using minimization of maximal regret (MMR) is introduced. We compare this technique with the classic Max-Min valuation method of decision making. We discuss a generalization of the MMR method leading to a parameterized family of minimal regret methods. We study this class in detail. An approach to decision making which combines valuation type decision functions with regret based decision functions is introduced. We apply the minimal regret method of decision making to situations in which our uncertainty profile is represented by a Dempster-Shafer belief structure.
Introduction
An important class decision making problems can best be discussed with the aid of Fig. 1 . The A i are a collection of alternatives one of which must be selected by the decision maker. The set X ¼ fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g contains the possible states (values) associated with some relevant variable U . Here c ij is the payoff to the decision maker if he selects alternative A i and the state of U is x j . An uncertainty is introduced due to the fact that the decision maker is unaware of the value of U before he must choose his preferred alternative. In particular, we are concerned with the special case of what we call Decision Making Under Ignorance (DMUI). The special feature of DMUI is that the decision maker has no information distinguishing the prospects of occurrences of the elements in X . Here he has no probabilities or any other measure over the space X . A number of different approaches have been suggested for helping the decision maker in this task [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . What must always be kept in mind is the choice of any approach to be used is a subjective one, in deciding upon a method to compare the alternatives the decision maker is implicitly using some personal preferences.
One commonly used approach in this DMUI environment is the Max-Min method. This method assigns to each alternative its worst payoff and then selects the alternative with best of these worst payoffs. Formally we calculate M i ¼ Min j ½c ij and then select A i Ã such that M i Ã ¼ Max i ½M i . Another common method, called the normative method, is to calculate the average payoff of each alternative and then select the alternative with the largest of these. Here T i ¼ 1 n P n j¼i c ij and we select A i Ã such T i Ã ¼ Max i ½T i . These two approaches can be seen as essentially using a valuation function V i ¼ F ðc i1 ; . . . ; c in Þ and selecting the alternative that maximizes this valuation function.
These valuation functions are examples of mean operators [8] . Among the notable properties of these valuation functions are the following. They are calculated point-wise, the calculation of V i just depends upon the payoffs associated with A i , V i ¼ F ðc i1 ; . . . ; c in Þ. They are monotonic, if c ij P c kj for all j then V i P V k . This implies that as the payoffs of an alternative increase its potential to become the chosen action should not decrease. Another property of these valuation based methods is their symmetry or commutativity. In the calculating F ðc i1 ; . . . ; c in Þ each of the argument terms is handled in the same manner, interchanging c ik with c ij does not effect the valuation. Another property is their boundedness, Min j ½c ij 6 V i 6 Max½c ij .
Essentially V i can be considered as a representative value for the alternative. Thus this valuation approach can be viewed as one in which we obtain some representative value for each alternative and then select the alternative with the largest representative value. The selection of the representative value can be seen as an adjudication of the uncertainty, we convert the multiple possible outcomes associated with an alternative into a single value. x 1 x j x n C ij Here we shall consider another approach based on a minimization of maximal regret.
The minimization of maximal regret approach
The method of comparing alternatives using the minimization of maximal regret is due to Savage [1] . In this approach we first obtain a regret matrix R whose components r ij indicate the decision maker's regret in selecting alternative A i when the state of U is x j . We then calculate the maximal regret for each alternative. We then select the alternative with the minimal of these maximal regrets. The regret r ij is obtained by first calculating the maximal payoff under U ¼ x j and then subtracting c ij from this value. Formally we proceed as follows:
Note: We shall call the matrix R whose components are the r ij the regret matrix. We shall refer to C j as the horizon under x j .
The following example illustrates the use of the minimal regret approach. The starred values indicate the horizons for each state. Here A 3 is our choice (Fig. 2 ).
We point out that this Minimization of Maximal Regret (MMR) approach is not pointwise. In particular the regret R i associated with alternative A i is not determined solely by the payoffs possible under A i , it also depends upon the payoffs associated with the other alternatives. Thus R i 6 ¼ F ðc i1 ; c 21 ; . . . ; c in Þ. This method is one that can be classified as context dependent. The regrets depend upon the horizons in addition to the payoffs. This characteristic implies that the MMR approach does not satisfy the condition of being indifferent to irrelevant alternatives discussed by Arrow [9] . As the following example from [7] illustrates, the addition of an alternative can change the choice of best alternative without itself becoming the new optimal choice.
Example: In Fig. 3 we consider the choice between A 1 and A 2 . Here the choice is A 1 . Consider the situation in Fig. 4 where we simply added an additional alternative A 3 . In this case our selected alternative becomes A 2 . Thus the introduction of A 3 has caused us to change our preferences from A 1 to
Conceptually what seems to have has happened here is that the introduction of A 3 has changed the perspective (context) of the decision maker, he now sees that there are greater possibilities associated with the state x 1 . This has lead him to realize that his regret associated with the selection of A 1 in the case when U ¼ x 1 is greater then he first thought. This in turn resulted in A 1 being less appealing.
One problem with this sensitivity to irrelevant alternatives is that it allows a kind a manipulation. We note that in situations in which the alternatives included are prescribed this issue is not raised. The following observation puts some boundary on this effect of adding alternatives.
Observation: Assume when selecting an alternative from the set A ¼ fA 1 ; . . . ; A m g we obtain as our horizons C j . Furthermore let A K be the alternative selected. If A mþ1 is an additional alternative such that its payoffs c mþ1;j satisfy c mþ1;j 6 C j for all j then the optimal alternative selected from
The reason for this is that even with the addition of A mþ1 the value of R i has not charged for i ¼ 1 to m, hence A K is such that it still satisfies that R K ¼ Min i¼1 to m ½R i . In this case A K is still preferred to any other A i for i ¼ 1 to m. The relationship between R K and R mþ1 must be determined in each situation.
Thus the addition or removal of an alternative that does not effect the horizons cannot introduce the irrelevant alternative effect.
Let us now consider the issue of monotonicity with respect to MMR. Here essentially we want to show that as we increase the payoffs of an alternative the more appealing the alternative becomes to be selected, its maximal regret decreases and that of its competitors does not decrease. The non-pointwise nature of the MMR approach somewhat complicates this determination.
Consider alternative A i whose payoffs are c ij . Assume we change the payoffs toc ij wherec ij P c ij for all j. We consider first the case where the newc ij 's do not effect the horizons. In this case the R k for k 6 ¼ i are unaffected. For A i we haver ij ¼ C j Àc ij 6 C j À c kj ¼ r kj for all j, hence e R i ¼ Max j ½r ij 6 Max j ½r ij 6 R i . ThusÃ i becomes a more appealing candidate for having the minimal regret then the original A i . We now consider the situation where the change effects the horizons. Sincec ij P c ij the the only effect that this can have is to increase the horizon for some outcome. In particular assume it results in the change of C j to e C j . In this case e C j P C j . Consider now some alternative A k where k 6 ¼ i in this caser kj ¼ e C j À c kj P C j À c kj ¼ r kj . Thus e R k can only increase with respect to R k hence reducing its appeal. Consider now the case of A i . Herer ij ¼ e C j Àc ij and r ij ¼ C j À c ij . For those j which have not had a change in horizon, e C j ¼ C j , and hencer ij P r ij . For those in which we have had a change in horizon the effect of this change is to make e C j ¼c ij . Thus in this caser ij ¼ e C j Àc ij ¼ 0 6 r ij ¼ C j À c ij . Thus we see that again in this situation we get that e R i ¼ Max j ½r ij 6 Max j ½r ij 6 R i hence the modified versionÃ i becomes a more appealing candidate for having the minimal regret then the original A i . Thus we see that the MMR method has the important feature of being what we shall call monotonic with respect to choice. Here by monotonic in choice we mean that as the possible payoffs of an alternative increases it does not become a less appealing choice.
Comparing Max-Min valuation and Min-Max regret methods
The following example helps illustrates the difference between the Max-Min valuation method and Min-Max regret method. Consider the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 5 .
The decision matrices using the two approaches are shown in Fig. 6 . Here the Max-Min valuation method selects A 2 while the Min-Max regret method selects A 1 . In this case the choice of A 1 appears to be better.
We pointed out the importance of the horizons associated with each state in the MMR approach. An interesting perspective on role of these horizons in MMR and its connection with being optimistic/pessimistic can be obtained using the following payoff matrix (see Fig. 7 ). In this matrix we shall assume a > b and b þ D ) a.
In order to be able to apply our intuition we shall assume the following semantics associated with the decision being made. A 1 and A 2 are two alternatives which we must choose between at the present time. However our concern is with the effect of this choice at some future time. We shall consider x 1 and x 2 as two possible states of the world at that future time with respect to some technology. Under state x 1 we assume a future world that has not changed with respect to the technology from the present world. In state x 2 we assume some ''scientific breakthrough'' with respect to the technology has occurred. We see that in the future world that continues the present, x 1 , selecting A 1 is preferred to A 2 . However, if a scientific breakthrough occurs A 2 becomes a preferred choice. We see that using the Max-Min valuation 100 25 28 27
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Regret Min approach we would select A 1 however using the Min-Max regret we select A 2 . Thus the MMR approach takes into account the possibility of a better horizon.
Another example of this is captured using the payoff matrix that is shown in Fig. 8 .
Here we have three states regarding the future. In x 1 , the future world continues the present, in x 2 a positive change occurs and in x 3 the selection of A 2 would lead a very undesirable situation. Using the Max-Min valuation we get select A 1 . In the case of using the MMR method we get the regret matrix shown in Fig. 9 . Here we see that A 1 is also the preferred choice.
An interesting and useful relationship exists between the MMR, Min-Max regret, approach and MMV, the Max-Min valuation, approach. Consider the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 1 and again let C j ¼ Max i ½c ij . Assume we subtract C j from all the payoffs associated with x j . In this case we get a new payoff matrix E shown in Fig. 10 . Here e ij ¼ c ij À C j .
In the following we show that if we apply the Max-Min valuation approach to the payoff matrix E we get the same solution as we get if we apply the Min-Max regret method to C. Using this Max-Min valuation on E we first obtain 
Generalized maximal valuation method
In [10] we suggested a generalization of the Max-Min valuation approach to decision making. This generalization made considerable use of the OWA operators [11, 12] . We first briefly describe the OWA operators and describe this generalization.
An OWA operator F is such that F ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ ¼ W T B ¼ P n j¼1 w j b j where b j is the jth largest of the arguments and w j are a collection of weights having the the properties w j 2 ½0; 1 and P w j ¼ 1. The n dimensional vector B is called the ordered argument vector and has components b j . W is also an n dimensional vector, called the weighting vector, with components w j . We shall find the following notation useful. Let id be an index function such that idðjÞ is the index of the jth largest of the arguments, thus b j ¼ a idðjÞ . Using this we can express the OWA aggregation as F ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ ¼ P n j¼1 w j a idðjÞ . We note that the OWA operator F is a mean operator [13] since it is symmetric, monotonic and bounded ðMin i ½a i 6 F ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ 6 Max i ½aÞ. It is also idempotent. By using different manifestations of W we are able to get different aggregation operators:
n for all i then F ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ ¼ 1 n P n j¼1 a j . Various other different forms of aggregation can be implemented using the OWA aggregation operator.
Thus the OWA operator provides a family of aggregation operators parameterized by the vector W . In Yager [11, 14] associated with each weighting vector W a scalar value called its attitudinal character which he defined as A-CðW Þ ¼ 1 nÀ1 P n j¼1 ðn À jÞw j . It can be shown that A-CðW Þ 2 ½0; 1. We note that A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 1, A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 0 and A-CðW N Þ ¼ 0:5. It can also be shown that W Ã and W Ã are uniquely the only vectors with attitudinal character of one and zero respectively. It is should be noted that if more of the total weight is located near the top of W the closer A-CðW Þ is to one while weights near bottom W drive the A-C to zero.
In [10] we suggested using the OWA operator to provide a generalization of the Max-Min and normative valuation approaches by using the OWA operator to define the valuation function. In particular we associated with each alternative A i a value V i , called its representative value or valuation defined such that
We then select as our preferred alternative A q such that V q ¼ Max i ½V i . By selecting different manifestations of W we can get different valuation functions. We shall generally refer to these approaches as Max-W valuation procedures.
If h i is an index function such that h i ðjÞ is the index of jth largest payoffs for the ith alternative then c ihi ðjÞ is the jth largest payoff associated with the alternative A i . Using this notation in the Max-W valuation procedure we get V i ¼ P n j¼1 w j c ihiðjÞ . As we noted by using different manifestations of the weighting vector W in the OWA operator we get different valuation functions and different decision imperatives. For example if W ¼ W Ã then V i ¼ Min j ½a ij and we obtain the classic Max-Min valuation decision approach. If W ¼ W Ã then V i ¼ Max j ½a ij and we get the optimistic Max-Max approach. If we select W ¼ W n then V i ¼ 1 n P n j¼1 c ij , the average of the payoffs for an alternative, we call this the normative approach.
If W is selected such that w 1 ¼ b and W n ¼ 1 À b and all other weights are zero then we get the Hurwicz decision criteria,
nÀ2 then we get a valuation that eliminates the upper and lower extreme values and takes an average of the rest. We refer to this as the olympic average.
We note that the median is also a member of this family. If n is odd then the median is obtained by assigning wnþ1 2 ¼ 1 and w j ¼ 0 for all others. If n is even then wn 2 þ1 ¼ wn 2 ¼ 0:5. In [10] an interesting and useful semantics was associated with W . Noting that w j 2 ½0; 1 and P j w j ¼ 1 it was suggested that the collection of weights in W can be viewed as a kind of attitudinal probability distribution. In particular we can view w j as the probability that the jth best outcome will happen. For the case W Ã where w n ¼ 1, the decision maker is very pessimistic, he believes with probability one the worst thing will happen. For W Ã when w 1 ¼ 1, the decision maker has an optimistic attitude, he believes with probability one that for any selected alternatives the uncertainty will be resolved in the best possible way. In this perspective V i can be viewed as a kind of ''pseudo'' expected value for alternative A i generated using the attitudinal probability distribution W .
In this framework of using the OWA operator it was suggested that the attitudinal character of a weighting vector, A-CðW Þ, can provide an indication of the degree of optimism associated with the decision approach. In support of this we see that A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 1, the most optimist, the most pessimist W Ã , has A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 0, the neutral W N has A-CðW N Þ ¼ 0:5 and the Hurwicz has A-CðW H Þ ¼ b.
We shall find it useful to introduce the idea of the dual of a weighting vector. Let W be an n-dimensional weighting vector its dual, denoted DualðW Þ ¼ b W , is also an n dimensional weighting vector such thatŵ j ¼ w nÀjþ1 . We note that DualðDualðW ÞÞ ¼ W . Thus duals appear in pairs. We see that DualðW Ã Þ ¼ W Ã thus W Ã and W Ã are dual pairs. Furthermore we note that DualðW N Þ ¼ W N , thus W N is self-dual. We see that the median is also self-dual. We note that any W for which w j ¼ w nÀjþ1 is self-dual. We can show that A-Cð b W Þ ¼ 1 À A-CðW Þ. From this it follows that if W is self-dual then A-CðW Þ ¼ 0:5.
Generalized minimal regret approach
We shall now provide a generalization of the Min-Max regret (MMR) approach in the spirit of the preceding. Let us first review the basic MMR approach. First we calculate C j ¼ Max i ½c ij , the maximal payoff for state x j , we call C j the horizon under x j . We then calculate r ij ¼ C j À c ij , this is the regret we have in choosing A i when x j is the outcome. We then define b R i ¼ Max j ½r ij , the maximal regret for alternative A i . We then select the alternative A q such that b
We now suggest replacing b
R i with a general regret function. In this case we get
where OWA W is an OWA aggregation using the weighting vector W . Once having obtained R i for each alternative we then select the alternative with the minimal value for R i . We shall refer to this selection process as the Min-W-Regret (MWR) procedure.
Formally we note that if g i is an index function such that g i ðjÞ is the jth largest of the regrets associated with alternative A i then R i ¼ P n j¼1 w j r igiðjÞ where w j are the weights associated with W . We note that in the case when
Thus our original Min-Max regret method is a special case of this generalized approach with W ¼ W Ã , it is Min-W Ã regret.
Another special case is when we use
Here we associate with each alternative the minimal regret and then again we select the alternative with the smallest R i .
Let us note some properties of this generalized Min-W-Regret approach. Assume A i and A k are two alternatives such that c ij P c kj for all j, for any state the payoff for A K is never greater than the payoffs for A i . We see that in this situation r ij ¼ C j À c ij 6 C j À c kj 6 r ik . Since the OWA operator is monotonic for all W we have R i ¼ OWA W ðr ij Þ 6 OWA W ðr kj Þ ¼ R K , thus here R i 6 R k . Since the Min-W-Regret approach selects the alternative with minimal regret we see that A k will never be preferred to A i . Thus we see that this MWR method exhibits a monotonicity with respect to choice.
Any decision of alternative using the Min-W-Regret method is indifferent to a transformation of the payoff involving the adding of a constant value to all the payoffs in a given state, adding a constant to all elements in one column. We see this as follows. Let C and e C be two payoff matrices which are identical except in the kth column, herec ik ¼ c ik þ a for all i. We note here that e C j ¼ Max i ½c ij ¼ Max i ½c ij ¼ C j for all j 6 ¼ k and in the case of the kth column of e C k ¼ C k þ a. It is clear that r ij ¼ C j À c ij ¼r ij for all all j 6 ¼ k. For the case where j ¼ k we see for any i, that r ik ¼ C k À c ik andr ik ¼ e C k Àc ik ¼ C k þ aÀ ðc ij þ aÞ ¼ r ik . Thus we see that e R i ¼ R i , hence they will given the same result. We point out that for the case of valuation based methods, such as the Max-Min valuation this does not hold true. The following simple example illustrates this difference. Consider the payoff method shown below. Here A 2 is the choice. On the other hand the regret matrix R obtained from either of the above is the same. In using the Min-W-Regret approach we can view R i as providing a kind of expected regret under the selection of alternative A i . Here w j represents the probability that the outcome with the jth largest regret will occur. Thus we see that for W Ã we have w 1 ¼ 1, we are assuming under the selection of any alternative the outcome with the largest regret will occur. For W Ã have w n ¼ 1, here we are assuming under the selection of any alternative the outcome with the smallest regret will occur.
In this approach we can associate a degree of optimism with the W that is used. We define R-OPTðW Þ ¼ 1 À A-CðW Þ. We see that for W Ã , A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 1 and hence R-OPTðW Ã Þ ¼ 0 while for W Ã we get A-CðW Ã Þ ¼ 0 and hence R-OPTðW Ã Þ ¼ 1. Thus we see that W Ã is a more optimistic choice than W Ã .
If we use W such that w 1 ¼ a and w n ¼ 1 À a, all other w j ¼ 0, we get
Here we are taking a weighted average of the maximal and minimal regret. We note here R-OPTðW Þ ¼ 1 À a.
We now consider an important special case. Here we let W ¼ W N , that is w j ¼ 1 n for all j. In this case the ordering the r ij does not matter and we get
In particular since C as the same for all R i , then the R i are ordered by the 1 n P n j¼1 c ij . Furthermore we see Min i ½R i ¼ Min i C À 1 n P n j¼1 c ij h i occurs for the alternative that has Max i 1 n P n j¼1 c ij h i . Thus this approach always selects the same alternative as the Max valuation method with W N . Observation: The Min-W-Regret method and the Max-W valuation method lead to the same decision when W ¼ W N .
Consider now the special case where all states have the same horizon, C j is the same for all x j , we shall denote this c. In this case for any alternative A i we have R i ¼ P n j¼1 w j r igiðjÞ where g i ðjÞ is the index of the state that gives the jth largest value of the r ik for alternative A i . We note
w j c igiðjÞ Furthermore, since r ik ¼ c À c ik for each A i the objects are ordered inversely to the their c ik value. Specially g i ðjÞ ¼ h iðjþnÀ1Þ and therefore R i ¼ cÀ P n j¼1 w j c i ; h iðjþnÀ1Þ Þ ¼ c À P n j¼1 w jþnÀ1 c ihiðjÞ . However this is can be expressed in terms of the dual of WR i ¼ c À P n j¼1ŵ j c ih i ðjÞ where b w j are the weights of the dual of W , b
W . From this we take as our decision the alternative A q such that we get the Min regret R q ¼ Min i ½R i . However the alternative A q that satisfies this is also the one that satisfies Max i ½ P n j¼1ŵ j c ihiðjÞ and therefore it is the alternative that has the maximal valuation under the use of b W , it is the choice under the Max-c W valuation method. We summarize this with the following observation.
Observation: In the situation when all states have the same maximal value, C j ¼ c, then the Min-W-Regret selection is the same as Max-c W valuation selection.
In particular we see that the standard regret approach, where we try to minimize the maximal regret, Min-W Ã regret leads to the same selection as the classical Max-Min valuation method if all the outcomes have the same horizon. The following example illustrates this (Fig. 11) .
We shall find the following notation useful. Let C be a payoff matrix and W an attitude vector. We let Min-W-R(C) indicate the decision made using the Min-W-Regret method on C and we let Max-W-V(C) indicate the decision made using Max-W valuation method on C. Thus we have shown if C has equal horizons for all states x j then Min-W-R(C) ¼ Max-c W-V(C). Here we further point out that if W is self-dual, b W ¼ W . Thus in the case of self-dual vectors and payoff matrices with the same horizon for all states horizons we have Min-W-R(C) ¼ Max-W-V(C). We note an interesting special case of selfdual operator is the median.
Previously we showed that if C is a decision matrix and if we add the same value to all the elements in one column this does not change the decision using the Min-W-Regret method One implication of this is following. If C is some initial payoff matrix, by adding an appropriate value to each column we can translate this into some payoff matrix e C such that all the states have the same horizon, e C j ¼ a. As we just noted using Min-W-Regret we make the same decision using e C as C. However, as we have just shown since e C has all horizons equal then the choice using the Min-W-Regret on e C is the same as using the
. However we should again point out Max-W-V( e C) does not necessarily give the same result as Max-W-V(C). Thus we must use e C. The following example illustrates the situation. Here we shall assume that W is W Ã . Consider the following initial payoff matrix C We also show a transformed matrix e C obtained by adding a fixed amount to each column so that all columns have the same maximum value, 100 (Fig. 12 ).
If we apply the Max-Min valuation approach to e C we get as we see in Fig.  13 below that A 1 is our choice.
If apply Min-c W regret to e C, we have b W is Max, thus we apply Min-Max regret to e C we also get A 1 as our choice as seen below (Fig. 14) . We can easily show that if we directly applied the Max-Min valuation approach to get C we would get A 2 as our choice.
We shall call the process of transforming a payoff matrix C to one in which all the states have the same horizon equihorization. A very special case of equihorization is one in which all the states have a horizon equal to the maximal element in C. We shall denote this matrix as C Ã .
We now shall provide another useful representation of the process of Min-W-Regret decision making. Again let C be some payoff matrix and let C j ¼ Max j ½c ij be the horizon for state x j . Let e ij ¼ c ij À C j , we call e ij the ''negret'' of selecting A i if state x j occurs. Let
we call E i the W-negret of A i . Consider now a decision process in which we select A q such that E q ¼ Max i ½E i . We shall call this the Max-W Negret method. We denote the result of a decision made using this on a payoff matrix C as Max-W-Neg(C). Let us look at this approach. First we note C j is the same as in the normal regret approach. Let q i be an indexing function such that q iðjÞ is the index of jth largest of the negrets associated with alternative A i . Using this we can express
We note that for a given alternative the ordering of the e ij is dual to the ordering of the r ij , thus e ie i ðjÞ ¼ e ig i ðnÀjþ1Þ where g i ðkÞ is the index of the kth largest of r ij , the regrets under alternative A i . Using this we get
w j e iq i ðjÞ ¼ X n j¼1 w j e igiðnÀjþ1Þ ¼ X n j¼1 w nÀjþ1 e igiðjÞ ¼ X n j¼1ŵ j e igiðjÞ Hereŵ j are the weights associated with b W the dual of W . Assume that E q is the maximal of these E i . This means that for all i. This also means that for all i. À X n j¼1ŵ j e qgqðjÞ 6 À X n j¼1ŵ j e igiðjÞ However since e ij ¼ c ij À C j ¼ Àr ij we see that À X n j¼1ŵ j e igiðjÞ ¼ X n j¼1ŵ j C igiðjÞ Based on this we make the following observation:
Thus here we can use either of these two methods. Its worth pointing out that if W is a self-dual aggregation attitude then W ¼ b
W and hence
Max-W-NegretðCÞ ¼ Min-W-RegretðCÞ
As we noted the median is an example of a self-dual operator.
Mixing valuation and regret methods
In the preceding we have suggested two classes of methods for making decisions under ignorance, those based on a calculation of the valuation of an alternative and those based upon a determination of the regret associated with an alternative. Here we shall look at approach that combines these two methods.
Again assume a payoff matrix as in Fig. 1 with payoffs c ij . Again let C j be the horizon, under x j . Consider now the following decision procedure.
(1) Let m ij ¼ c ij À aC j where a 2 ½0; 1 (2) For each alternative A i calculate
We shall denote process as Max-W/a-Val/Neg decision making. Let us consider some special cases. If a ¼ 0 we get that m ij ¼ c ij and this becomes Max-W-Val method. If a ¼ 1 we get m ij ¼ c ij À C j ¼ e ij . Thus in this case we are using Max-W-Negret method which is equivalent to the Min-c W regret method. Actually we see that
Thus m ij is a weighted average of the negret and the payoff.
Here then this can be seen as providing a decision technique that allows for some kind of balancing between using the regret and valuation methods.
It is important to emphasize that the OWA aggregation is based upon the ordering of the m ij . In the following we shall let f i indicate the ordering of the payoffs associated with A i with respect to m, f i ðjÞ is the index of the state having jth largest of the m values for A i . Specifically m ifiðjÞ is the jth largest m value for A i . Using this we can express M i as
w j c ifiðjÞ À w j aC fiðjÞ
Let us now consider some special cases of W . First we see
In this case we see the selection is made solely on the bases of P n j¼1 c ij , it is independent of a. Thus here we select the alternatives with the largest average payoff. This is not unexpected as both valuation and regret methods use this when W ¼ W n .
Consider now the case when W is the Min, W ¼ W Ã here w n ¼ 1 and all other weights equal zero. In this case M i ¼ Min j ½m ij ¼ Min j ½ae ij þ ð1 À aÞc ij ¼ Min j ½c ij À aC i . We note here that if a ¼ 0 then M j ¼ Min j ½c ij and we get the Max-Min valuation method. If a ¼ 1 then M j ¼ Min j ½e ij , here we get the Max-Min Negret however as we have shown since Max-W-Neg(C) is the same as Min-c W-Reg(C) we get our original the Min-Max regret. So we get that for W ¼ W Ã we are adjudicating between the Min-Max regret and Max-Min valuation. Thus in this case a can be viewed as the degree to which we are using the Min-Max regret and ð1 À aÞ is the degree to which we are using the Max-Min valuation.
Using regret methods with D-S belief structures
In the preceding we considered the decision problem shown in Fig. 1 under the assumption that we have no information about the prospects of the different states of nature occurring. Here we shall consider a situation with less ignorance. We shall assume our knowledge about the prospects of the different states occurring is captured by a Dempster-Shafer belief structure. Assume X is the set of possible states described in Fig. 1 , X ¼ fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g. A D-S belief structure on X is a mapping m:.2 X ! ½0; 1 such that ð1Þ mð£Þ ¼ 0 and ð2Þ X AX mðAÞ ¼ 1
We call the collection of subsets of X for which mðAÞ 6 ¼ 0 focal elements and we shall denote these as B i where i ¼ 1 to q. We shall also denote mðB i Þ ¼ a i .
A semantics that can be associated with the D-S belief structure as a representation of our knowledge of the prospects of the different states/payoffs in Fig. 1 is the following. We perform a probabilistic experiment whose outcome is a subset of the space X . In particular for this experiment mðB i Þ is the probability that B i will be the subset selected. Once having determined the subset by this random process an element is chosen from this subset. We are ignorant about the process of choosing an element from the winning set. We can see the following connection with the original decision making under ignorance and this situation. In the original case all know is that some state is selected from X , in the situation considered here we have a mechanism, although random, which reduces the space from which we select our element from X to one of the B i .
In [10] Yager suggested a general approach to decision making in the face of D-S uncertainty based on the valuation type method. Here we introduce an approach to decision making under Dempster-Shafer uncertainty based on the regret type paradigm. We shall first describe the extension of the basic Min-Max regret approach to this D-S situation and then discuss the extension of the more general Max-W regret method to this environment.
As our point of departure we assume a decision matrix C as in Fig. 1 and a D-S belief structure m with focal elements B k , k ¼ 1; . . . ; q, on the set X ¼ fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g. Here c ij is the payoff if we select alternative A i and the outcome is x j . Our basic Min-Max regret decision process in this D-S environment is described in the following algorithm:
1. Using C calculate the horizon for each outcome state: C j ¼ Max i ½c ij 2. Calculate the regret matrix R: r ij ¼ C j À c ij 3. For each alternative A i calculate the Maximum-regret associated with the selection of focal element B k , R i ðkÞ. We do this as
Thus we take the maximal over all regrets of states in B k . We do this for all B K . 4. Calculate the expected maximal regret R i for alternative A i
It is the expected value over all focal elements. 5. Select the alternative A i Ã which as the minimal maximal expected regret
We consider two special cases. The first is the one in which our belief structure has only one focal element, B 1 ¼ X with mðB 1 Þ ¼ 1. In this situation we essentially have the case of decision making under ignorance. We can easily see that in this case our approach reduces to the usual method of Min-Max regret. Specially we note that R i ¼ Max xj2X ½r ij .
Next we consider the case in which each focal element is a singleton, B i ¼ fx i g. This case corresponds to a pure probabilistic uncertainty. We shall denote mðB i Þ ¼ p i . In this case
since each B k has just one element x k . Using this we get the
Let us denote P n k¼1 c ik p k ¼ EV i , indicating the expected payoff under A i and let us denote P n k¼1 C k p k ¼ e C, it is the expected value of the horizons. We further note that P n k¼1 C k p k appears in all alternatives. Thus we see that the alternatives with the minimal value of e R i is the one with the maximal value for P n k¼1 c ik p k . Thus in this case we select the alternative with the largest expected payoff.
We now consider the extension of this approach to more generalized formulation for regret calculating than simply using the max. Here we want to implement the formulation that we used in the Min-W-Regret method. This generalization reflects itself in the preceding algorithm step 3, the calculation of R i ðkÞ. Let W be a OWA vector indicating our preferred aggregation method. To calculate R i ðkÞ we consider alternative A i and focal element B k . We note that for each element x j 2 B K we have regret r ij under the selection A i . We shall let S i ðkÞ indicate the bag of regrets associated with the elements in B k . More formally S i ðkÞ ¼ ½r ij jx j 2 B k . Using this we can now calculate R i ðkÞ as the OWA aggregation of the elements in S i ðkÞ using W , R i ðkÞ ¼ OWA W ðS i ðkÞÞ. Once having R i ðkÞ for each focal element we proceed just as in the basic Min-Max regret. We calculate R i ¼ P q k¼1 RiðkÞmðB k Þ and the select the alternative with the smallest of these.
One special issue that must be discussed in calculating OWA W ðSðkÞÞ. Since each focal element B k may be of different cardinality this requires the availability of a weighting vector W of different dimensionality for each focal element. In generating these weighting vectors we would like to determine them in a consistent manner across all the focal elements. That is in performing the decision process we want to reflect a particular attitude in determining the weighting vector. We briefly discuss two methods for determining the vector W , further discussion can be found in the literature. One approach is due to O'Hagan [15] . Here all we need specify is a degree of optimism a 2 ½0; 1. Using the method suggested by O'Hagan we can use this a to determine in a consistent way a weighted vector of each requested cardinality which has this degree of optimism. The method involves solving a mathematical program-ming problem. Closely related to this approach is a method based upon the use of the E-Z OWA weights [16] . Here again we need only provide the degree of optimism a. This method does not require the solution of a mathematical program problem and uses a very simple method of weight generation.
The second approach is to use a BUM function, a mapping f : ½0; 1 ! ½0; 1 such that 1 f ð0Þ ¼ 0, f ð1Þ ¼ 1 and f ðxÞ P f ðyÞ if x P y. Using this function we obtain the weighting W for any focal element B k such that
where jB K j is the cardinality of the focal element. As discussed in [17] we can use the function f to capture our decision attitude. While we shall not pursue this issue further here we note the special case of f , where f ðxÞ ¼ x here we always get w j ¼ 1 jB k j . Other agenda's can be suggested for expressing the weighting vectors. We shall use the notation W K as the weighting vector associated with the focal element B K , and let w kj be the jth element in this vector. We note that the vector W K has jB K j ¼ n K elements and these must sum to one and lie in the unit interval. We could express our attitude by requiring w k1 ¼ 1 for all k, this is essentially pessimistic. This is essentially the Min-Max regret. If we require w kjB k j ¼ 1 for all k then we get pure optimism. This is the case of Min-Min regret.
Conclusion
We are concerned with the problem of uncertain decision making. We described the paradigm of decision making using minimization of maximal regret (MMR). We compared this technique with the classic Max-Min valuation method of decision making. We suggested a generalization of the MMR method in the form of a parameterized family of minimal regret methods. We studied this class in detail. An approach to decision making with combines valuation type decision functions with regret based decision functions was introduced. We applied the minimal regret method of decision making to situations in which our uncertainty profile is represented by a Dempster-Shafer belief structure.
